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Abstract
Background: Illegal,UnreportedandUnregulated(IUU)fishingisaproblemformarineresourcemanagers,leadingtodepletion
of fish stocks and negative impacts on marine ecosystems. These problems are particularly evident in regions with weak
governance. Countries responsible for sustainable natural resource management in the Southern Ocean have actively worked
to reduce IUU fishing in the region over a period of 15 years, leading to a sequence of three distinct peaks of IUU fishing.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We reviewed existing public records relating to IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean
between 1995–2009 and related this information to the governance capacity of flag states responsible for IUU vessels. IUU
operators used a number of methods to adapt to enforcement actions, resulting in reduced risks of detection, apprehension
and sanctioning. They changed fishing locations, vessel names and flag states, and ports for offloading IUU catches. There
was a significant decrease in the proportion of IUU vessels flagged to CCAMLR countries, and a significant decrease in the
average governance index of flag states. Despite a decreasing trend of IUU fishing, further actions are hampered by the
regional scope of CCAMLR and the governance capacity of responsible states.
Conclusions/Significance: This is the first study of long-term change in the modus operandi of IUU fishing operators,
illustrating that IUU operators can adapt to enforcement actions and that such dynamics may lead to new problems
elsewhere, where countries have a limited capacity. This outsourcing of problems may have similarities to natural resource
extraction in other sectors and in other regions. IUU fishing is the result of a number of factors, and effectively addressing
this major challenge to sustainable marine resource extraction will likely require a stronger focus on governance. Highly
mobile resource extractors with substantial funds are able to adapt to changing regulations by exploiting countries and
regions with limited capacity.
Citation: O ¨sterblom H, Sumaila UR, Bodin O ¨, Hentati Sundberg J, Press AJ (2010) Adapting to Regional Enforcement: Fishing Down the Governance Index. PLoS
ONE 5(9): e12832. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012832
Editor: A. Peter Klimley, University of California Davis, United States of America
Received June 1, 2010; Accepted August 24, 2010; Published September 17, 2010
Copyright:  2010 O ¨sterblom et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was funded by a post doc scholarship by FORMAS (http://formas.se/) awarded to HO ¨, grant number 2008-504. HO ¨ and O ¨B received additional
support by MISTRA (http://www.mistra.org/). The Sea Around Us and Global Ocean Economics Projects, both funded by the Pew Charitable Trust (http://www.
pewtrusts.org/), supported RS. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: henrik.osterblom@stockholmresilience.su.se
Introduction
Resilient organizations are characterized by a high adaptive
capacity, often resulting from well developed social networks
which maintain and build trust and social capital [1,2]. Such
institutions have been described for the management of natural
resources [3], but organizations involved in criminal activities have
also been described as resilient to law enforcement due to a high
adaptive capacity [4]. Sustainable management of complex and
dynamic natural resources benefit from resilient governance
structures that can adapt to changing conditions [5], but such
management can be severely complicated by different forms of
environmental crime [6]. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported
(IUU) fishing [7,8,9] is a challenge for sustainable management of
marine ecosystem and regions with weak governments may be
particularly vulnerable to IUU fishing [8]. Thus far, relatively little
is known about factors that contribute to the resilience of IUU
fishing and how IUU operators adapt to changing conditions.
Here, we investigate the adaptive capacity of IUU fishing by
documenting 15 years of changing modus operandi by vessel
operators involved in such fishing in the Southern Ocean. The
aim of this study is to describe how IUU fishing changed over time
in the CCAMLR (the Commission for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources) Convention area, and how
these changes influence the capacity of CCAMLR to effectively
address this non-compliance, using proxies for flag state
governance capacity. Flag states hold the primary responsibility
for vessels [10], but their incentives, authority or ability to address
non-compliance [11] may depend on a range of factors.
Previous research has shown that efforts to address IUU fishing
in one region can move the problem elsewhere, or create other
novel problems [12,13]. These characteristics, where any attempt
to solve a problem will generate new ones, is analogous to the
definition of wicked problems, which have no ultimate solution
[14]. Another definition of a wicked problems is that they are
usually symptoms of other problems [14]. Overcapacity and
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legitimacy of remote fishing zones [15], poverty and lack of
alternative livelihoods [9], have all been described as contributing
to IUU fishing.
Substantial IUU catches for toothfish Dissostichus spp. have been
recorded in the Southern Ocean. Although IUU catches of other
species and in other regions are more substantial [8], the long
history (.15 years) of IUU fishing for Dissostichus spp. combined
with the dedicated work by members (Contracting Parties: CPs) of
the regional management body (CCAMLR) provides a valuable
platform for studying the dynamics of IUU fishing and strategies
employed by vessel owners and operators to maintain their
resilience to actions taken by flag states, port states and countries
with nationals involved in such fishing. Toothfish stocks are
concentrated around Sub-Antarctic islands in the Southern Ocean
and a number of CCAMLR CPs are involved in regulated fisheries
for toothfish, which has provided a strong incentive for them to
reduce IUU fishing [13,18,19,20,21].
When IUU fishing emerged as a major issue for CCAMLR in
the mid 1990s, its IUU catches was several times higher than those
of licensed fisheries and threatened the sustainability of toothfish
stocks and seabird populations (as a direct result of bycatches in
the longline fishery for toothfish) [22]. Because of its unreported
nature, the level of IUU fishing compromised the accuracy of
toothfish stock assessments and impacted the profitability of the
toothfish industry [23]. Estimated economic losses from IUU
fishing for toothfish are in the order of hundreds of million U.S.
dollars [24,25]. Vessels engaged in IUU fishing have been
recorded as relocating from South America and Europe as a
result of stock depletion of toothfish and other predatory fish stocks
elsewhere [19]. Information on IUU fishing during the early 2000s
indicated an increased involvement of Asian interests and the
emergence of organized and coordinated trade of toothfish in Asia
[25]. Several suspected IUU vessels included refitted former tuna
long-lining vessels. New, and more valuable, purpose built vessels
were increasingly being used as the IUU fishing industry
developed. Efforts to address IUU fishing has been complicated
by the ability of IUU vessel operators to change vessel name, flag
state and fishing location. This general trend has been described
elsewhere [13,20].
In this study, we show that actions taken by CCAMLR and CPs
to address IUU fishing have resulted in adaptations by actors
engaged in IUU fishing. These adaptations have increased the
resilience of IUU fishing, thereby complicating the work of
CCAMLR by creating a wicked problem.
Results
A sequence of adaptations by IUU operators
A total of 147 suspected offshore IUU activities involving 72
officially identified vessels were recorded between 1995–2009. Out
of these records, 95% were related to IUU fishing and 5% related
to support of known IUU vessels.
During the first period (1995–1999), estimated IUU fishing
reached a historical peak and also declined substantially (Fig. 1). 39
records involved 31 vessels and 23% of the vessels were observed
more than once. 97% of all records contained information on the
location of the IUU activity. No name changes were recorded,
although one flag changed during the period. Information on flag
states (97% of all records) showed that CCAMLR CPs Argentina
(24%) and Chile (16%), as well as Non-Contracting Parties (NCPs)
Belize (21%), Panama (13%) and Portugal (11%), dominated the
list of flag states (Fig. 2). Relatively little information was available
on the nationality of officers (23%) and crew (15%), but the data
suggests substantial involvement of Spanish (56%) and Chilean
officers (22%) during this period. Crews were from nine countries,
Figure 1. Three periods of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean. Estimated levels of IUU fishing in the CCAMLR area between 1995–2008 [50]
during three distinct phases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012832.g001
IUU Fishing and Governance
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 September 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 9 | e12832mainly in Southern Africa, South America and Spain. Port records
indicated a preference for offloading IUU catches of toothfish in
Port Louis, Mauritius (69%, n=64), and Walvis Bay, Namibia
(23%), as well as other Southern African harbors. The average
landed amount was 208 tonnes (n=29), including both fishing
vessels and cargo ships.
During the second period 41 incidents involved 30 vessels, with
27% of all vessels being observed more than once. Three of these
were also active in the previous period. Five name and flag
changes were recorded. Records with information on flag states
(95%) showed that CCAMLR CPs Uruguay (23%) and Russia
(13%) had emerged as new major flag states, together with 4 other
CPs and 10 NCPs. No vessels were flagged to either Chile or
Argentina (Fig. 3). 83% of the records contained information on
suspected IUU location. Information on the nationality of officers
and crew was available for 37% and 22% of the records
respectively. Spanish nationals were officers in all known records,
although Russian and Uruguayan officers were also identified.
Crewmembers were mainly from Chile and Indonesia. Mauritius
was still an important harbor for suspected IUU landings (36%,
n=28 records), as was Walvis Bay (21%), and a number of
Southern African ports, and for the first time, East Asian
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore) ports. An average of 209 tonnes
toothfish per vessel was offloaded (n=11).
During the third period (2005–2009), estimated IUU catches
were lower than previously (Fig. 1), but dedicated offshore patrol
programs generated substantial information (67 records of 26
vessels, with 62% of vessels observed more than once). Half of all
vessels observed (13 vessels) had been active in the previous period,
but only one of these had also been active during the first period.
The location of IUU fishing activity was known in 94% of the
records. Seventeen name changes and 9 flag changes were
recorded during the period. The available information on flag
states (91%) illustrated China as flag state (8%), although before it
became a Contracting Party to CCAMLR. NCPs Togo (38%) and
Equatorial Guinea (23%) emerged as important flag states. Two of
the vessels recorded engaged in IUU activities with flags from
these countries have previously been documented as IUU vessels
flagged to Contracting Parties. An additional six vessels on the
CCAMLR IUU list have also reflagged from Contracting Parties
to Togo or Equatorial Guinea at some point, although the publicly
available records did not contain any information on suspected
IUU activities of these vessels while flagged to contracting parties,
prior to reflagging to Togo or Equatorial Guinea. A number of
vessels were also flagged to North Korea (8%), (Fig. 4). Spanish
and Chilean nationals were involved as officers and crew in the
few records available (6%). There was only a single recorded
suspected landing of IUU toothfish during the period. An
additional 28 records of port visits by vessels known to have been
involved in IUU fishing for toothfish were recorded, but no
information regarding landings of toothfish was available for these
vessels.
Temporal trends in governability
The number of IUU fishing vessels flagged by a particular flag
state generally increased over a short time period and subsequently
decreased, presumably as vessels involved in IUU fishing were
deregistered by the flag state. New flag states emerged over time
and generally showed a similar pattern of flagging IUU fishing
vessels. There was a significant negative trend in the proportion of
IUU fishing activities associated with vessels flagged to CCAMLR
CPs over time (log-transformed data, R
2 0.32, p,0.02, n=15,
Fig. 5a) as vessels increasingly used flags of NCPs.
The mean values of four governance indices of flag states
(Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and
Control of Corruption, see [8]) declined significantly over time (R
2
0.75, p,0.001, n=15, Fig. 5b), indicating that vessels are not only
using NCP flags to a larger extent, but are also increasingly
choosing countries with weak governments as flag states, with,
presumably, lower ability to address non-compliance. There was
Figure 2. Changing fishing locations and flag states 1995–1999. Suspected IUU vessels of known location and flag states during the first
period (see Figure 1). Argentina (AR), Belize (BZ), Chile (CL), Republic of Korea (KR), Panama (PA), Portugal (PL), Seychelles (SC), South Africa (ZA). Thin
line: one record, medium line: two records, thick line: three or more records.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012832.g002
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(Stability/No violence) over time (R
2 0.38, p,0.01, n=15),
however, the slope was significantly smaller than for the other
governance indices (p,0.03, Fig. 3b.) which could indicate a
preference in ship owners of using relatively stable countries as flag
states.
Discussion
Effects of actions to address non-compliance
Estimated levels of IUU fishing have decreased substantially
from 1995 to 2009, illustrating progress made to address IUU
fishing by CCAMLR and CPs [13,15,19,23,26]. The three pulses
Figure 3. Changing fishing locations and flag states 2000–2004. Suspected IUU vessels of known location and flag states during the second
period (see Figure 1). Netherlands Antilles (AN), Belize (BZ), Georgia (GE), Ghana (GH), Equatorial Guinea (GQ), Honduras (HN), Russia (RU), Seychelles
(SC), Sao Tome and Principle (ST), Togo (TG), United Kingdom (UK), Uruguay (UY), Saint Vincent and Grenadines (VC).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012832.g003
Figure 4. Changing fishing locations and flag states 2005–2009. Suspected IUU vessels of known location and flag states during the third
period (see Figure 1). Belize (BZ), China (CN), Georgia (GE), Equatorial Guinea (GQ), Cambodia (KH), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (KP),
Panama (PA), Russia (RU), Sierra Leone (SL), Togo (TG).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012832.g004
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modus operandi of IUU fishing operators, although we also observed
a continuous adaptation as measured in governance capacity of
flag states (Fig. 5). IUU vessels have increasingly been pushed out
of national waters of the UK, France and Australia due to
increased monitoring, control and surveillance at sea, and from
South African waters due to stock depletion [13,19,27,28]. This
has led to a change in fishing locations (an eastward and
southward expansion of the IUU fishery and increased fishing in
the high seas [13,19,20], and increased targeting of Antarctic
toothfish, D. mawsoni, rather than Patagonian toothfish, D.
eleginoides. Such roving bandit behavior [29] has been described
for marine resources elsewhere [17], but primarily as a response to
stock depletion, rather than enforcement efforts.
Some suspected vessels were merely observed and reported, but
not apprehended – the suspected IUU activities thus had no direct
consequences for those with interests in the vessels. Several of the
apprehended vessels however, were bonded for release. These
vessels were subsequently either released as the owners paid the
bond, or remained the property of apprehending governments,
which sold, scrapped or refitted the vessel for other purposes.
Released vessels may have relocated to other areas and other
fisheries.
CCAMLR CPs have for the most part, actively de-flagged their
vessels when they have been identified as engaged in IUU
activities. NCPs have experienced diplomatic pressure from
CCAMLR CPs [15], resulting in actions against vessels flagged
to these countries. However, diplomatic actions towards the more
recently emerging IUU vessel flag states appear less effective, as
their response to requests by CCAMLR members is limited [26].
Over the period of this study, the pattern of preferred IUU vessel
flag states has changed, from primarily vessels initially being
flagged to CPs, then to NCPs, and, in the recent period,
increasingly to flag states with weak governance. The capacity of
CCAMLR to further reduce IUU fishing is hampered by the fact
that none of the recorded IUU fishing vessels currently active are
flagged to CPs, and their current flag states have limited capacity
to take action against their vessels, or are not effectively in control
of their vessel register. The recent concentration of IUU fishing
vessels flagging to a small number of flag states may indicate that a
decreasing number of countries are willing to flag IUU vessels, or
that the operators and beneficial owners of these vessels are
deliberately targeting weak governance.
Several states have developed national legislation aimed at
dissuading their nationals from engaging in IUU fishing [30].
Some countries have been successful in reducing the involvement
of their nationals [23] and other have more recently made such
progress [26,28]. For instance, a number of legal procedures are
underway in Spain [31]. Recent European legislation and ongoing
developments in Chilean legislation is directly aimed at reducing
the involvement of related nationals in IUU fishing [26]. However,
effectively addressing nationals involved in IUU fishing requires a
dialogue between relevant countries and flag states, and this
dialogue can be severely hampered when these flag states have a
low governance capacity.
Taking action against IUU vessel owners is often not
straightforward, as ownership is commonly disguised by complex
company structures, often in part registered in tax havens [32].
However, significant diplomatic pressure, as well as social pressure
from environmental NGOs and industry has been directed at
vessels owners [23,25,28,33,34,35,36] with some success.
Ports of landings have also changed over time. Mauritius was
unequivocally identified as the main port for IUU-caught fish
during the first period, and was also important during the second
period [37]. Together with Walvis Bay, Namibia, these ports were
eventually closed down to recorded IUU landings [37,38]. Recent
public information on port landings is generally lacking, although
the CCAMLR Commission refers to, for example, landings in
Singapore [28], the largest container port in the world [39].
Australia has recently further referred to Indonesia, Malaysia,
Mozambique and Kenya as important ports for IUU vessels [28].
Adaptive capacity of IUU fishing
Presumably changes in modus operandi of IUU fishing aims at
reducing the risks and costs of detection, apprehension, and
sanctioning. The Australian hot pursuit of the Russian flagged Lena
in 2002 (which managed to escape as she was refueled by another
vessel [40]) and the apprehension of the same Lena and Volga that
year, suggested that IUU fishing had become increasingly
organized [24]. The Volga case before the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) revealed that she was fishing in a
fleet of at least seven boats. These vessels allegedly received logistic
support from an oil tanker, as well as detailed information on the
whereabouts of the Australian fisheries patrol vessel [41]. The
Figure 5. The capacity of CCAMLR to address IUU fishing.
Changes over time in a) The proportion of suspected offshore IUU
activities with vessels flagged to CCAMLR contracting parties (CP),
y=e ‘(306.867720.1541*yr) and b) Flag state governance capacity. Solid
symbols=Average, combined governance index for Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of
Corruption, of flag states for all suspected IUU activities,
y=240.8220.12 * yr. Open symbols=Governance indexes for Stabili-
ty/No violence, of flag states for suspected offshore IUU activities,
y=125.5120.062 * yr. The number of suspected IUU activities recorded
each year is indicated in the graph.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012832.g005
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vessels in the fleet) were sacrificed in order to prevent the other
more valuable vessels from being apprehended [41].
In addition to frequent name and flag changes, other means to
reduce the probability of detection [7] included obscuring the
name of the vessel [42]. Means to reduce the probability of
apprehension, once detected, include receiving legal advice during
hot pursuit [15]. If detected, standard procedure appears to have
included the dumping of catch, log books, computers and other
potential evidence [42]. Sustained legal support during the trials of
apprehended IUU operators reduces the probability of sanction-
ing, and are also indicative of coordinated activities [43]. A trial
and conviction related to IUU fishing for toothfish exposed the
existence of bribery of port officials [44], a technique used to
further reduce the risk of detection.
A large number of vessels identified during the first period were
not observed in subsequent periods. Agnew [19] suggested that a
hard core of IUU operators had replaced many of the
opportunistic operators active during the first period. Currently
active IUU operators, fishing in the high seas and flagged to NCPs,
are beyond the reach of CCAMLR inspections (that is, they are
engaged in unregulated fishing). The recent concentration of
vessels flagged to Togo and Equatorial Guinea indicate that this is
currently a viable modus operandi option. These countries are among
the lowest scoring for several governance indices [45]. However,
they score relatively high on indices related to stability and
violence, indicating that IUU operators tend to choose stable flag
states with limited governance capacity.
The ports of landing IUU catches appear to be increasingly far
from the fishing grounds. This would result in higher costs of IUU
fishing (larger steaming distances), however many of the vessels
currently on the CCAMLR IUU vessel lists have been observed in
harbor without catch [27], and it has been suggested that they
increasingly conduct transshipments at sea to cargo vessels or to
legitimately licensed fishing vessels [27,40]. IUU fishing vessel
operators have also started to use gillnets for catching toothfish
[28,46]. This is likely to reduce costs and also generate valuable
bycatch [26,46]. Estimated catches with this gear type is uncertain.
All indications suggest that the IUU fishing fleet inside the
CCAMLR convention area has decreased and that no new vessels
are being observed [26]. Whether these vessels have ceased their
IUU activities or are developing new ones elsewhere [46], is
currently uncertain.
IUU operators appear adaptive, likely due to a combination of
increased offshore coordination and consolidation, hidden corpo-
rate beneficiaries and substantial monetary assets - factors that
enable them to effectively reduce risks and increase profits. These
factors contribute to their resilience and thus the wickedness of the
problem of combating IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean. The
substantial profits for vessel owners and officers have produced
strong incentives to maintain and develop their capacity to remain
resilient in the face of change.
Potential biases
The information on suspected IUU fishing provided here suffer
from a number of potential biases (see Materials and Methods).
The conclusions may therefore be skewed towards changes in
modus operandi of IUU fishing operators more likely to be detected,
whereas IUU fishing operators less known and less detected will be
under-represented. Nonetheless, the substantial information col-
lected here, over an extended time period, we argue, is sufficiently
reliable to provide valuable insights into some key adaptations
made by IUU operators in response to CCAMLR and individual
States enforcement measures, although acknowledging that care
should be taken when interpreting the results. Other adaptations
than those described here are likely to have occurred. For instance,
the name and flag changes reported here is incomplete, as we only
record changes between known records of IUU activities. The
IUU vessel list maintained by CCAMLR [47] keep updated
records of black-listed vessel since 2003, including all known name
and flag changes. This list indicates the adaptive capacity of
several well-known IUU vessels that have operated in the region
continuously since 2003.
Conclusions
A high adaptive capacity has enabled IUU fishing vessel
operators to continue to engage in IUU fishing in the CCAMLR
area despite enforcement measures and international pressure on
flag states. There appears to be no clear ultimate solutions to IUU
fishing, as attempts to solve it generate new problems elsewhere
(thereby making IUU fishing correspond to the definition of a
wicked problem). In the CCAMLR area, IUU operators adapted
by changing fishing ground, ports of landings and flag states. This
adaptive capacity has resulted in a co-evolution between IUU
operators and managing authorities at national and international
levels. The magnitude of IUU fishing in the EEZ of a country has
been correlated to governance capacity of that state [8]; and
compliance mechanisms in a Regional Fisheries Management
Organization (RFMO) can lead to the displacement of IUU vessels
[12]. Here, we show that changing flag states appear to be a
deliberate strategy aimed at adapting to management measures.
National and regional approaches to IUU fishing taken in
isolation risk the perverse result of ‘outsourcing’ the problems to
regions and countries with less ability to address them. This ‘‘race
to the bottom’’, or ‘‘fishing down the governance index’’ with a
relocation of IUU fishing operations to regions with weak
governance, can only be addressed by realizing that IUU fishing
is a symptom of other problems. Addressing non-compliance and
novel adaptations in IUU fishing must build on enforcement and
management measures at appropriate scales, including, for
example, implementation of the recent port state agreement
[12,48], information sharing, capacity building (for example using
the IMCS network, www.imcsnet.org), and increased international
coordination [8]. However, addressing overcapacity, depleted fish
stocks, RFMO legitimacy and alternative livelihoods for crew on
IUU vessels would also provide complementary approaches to
direct action on IUU fishing.
Materials and Methods
We reviewed existing public records relating to the dynamics of
IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean between 1995–2009. Records
of alleged IUU activities (fishing, other offshore activities, landings)
were derived from publicly available documents from CCAMLR
and governments, national and international court cases, report
from fisheries inspections, reports and web pages from NGOs and
the fishing industry, journal articles, press releases and books
(Tables S1 and S2).
Three phases of IUU fishing
CCAMLR continuously estimate the levels of IUU fishing for
toothfish each fishing season (December 1–November 30), and
these estimated suggest that IUU fishing have exhibited three
distinct phases (Fig. 1). We used the fishing seasons (or CCAMLR-
years) these three phases to define our three periods for
investigating changes in modus operandi of IUU fishing, using
November 30 as break point in 1999 and 2004 respectively. We
make the case that the three phases are the results of adaptations
IUU Fishing and Governance
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diplomatic pressure, a Catch Documentation Scheme and
increased offshore enforcement, respectively [13,15,19,49]. The
aim of separating the data into these periods is to investigate
general patterns of adaptations by IUU fishing operators.
The number of recorded IUU activities reported for these
periods is not individually comparable, due to different levels of
intensity in the publication of, for example, NGO reports or
offshore patrols (detecting IUU fishing location, as well as vessel
name and flag changes). Rather, the information obtained is
intended to illustrate major trends in vessel flags, nationality of
crew, landing ports, and other general changes in modus operandi.
Main fishing locations derived from these records are illustrated,
although these estimates are based on less detailed information
than CCAMLR estimated IUU catches [50].
This study uses data and information from publicly available
resources and these resources containing information on suspected
IUU activities suffer from a number of potential biases. Vessels
with operators more skilled at avoiding detection and apprehen-
sion will be less likely to be included in these sources. Conversely,
well-known IUU fishing vessels will have the eyes of industry,
environmental NGOs and government agencies on them, resulting
in more records for these vessels. Fishing locations, flag states and
nationality of crew for IUU vessels may also influence the
probability of being recorded in the material used. Fishing
locations less monitored will result in fewer records. Information
on IUU fishing from countries used as flag states or having their
nationals involved in IUU fishing may be influenced by e.g. the
activity of environmental NGOs in that country, where countries
with active NGO groups or fishing industry will be more likely to
provide information on IUU fishing. The proportion of all IUU
activities being recorded may also vary in space and over time due
to changing focus of groups and organization providing informa-
tion on IUU fishing. Vessels may change name, flag, color
marking and other distinguishing features, resulting in a risk that
any vessel recorded twice under different names will be recorded
as two vessels. In this study, substantial efforts have been made to
use all available information in public records to follow all known
name and flag changes.
Not all alleged IUU fishing activities in these records have
resulted in apprehension and/or sanctioning. Some allegations of
IUU activities has also been challenged by the flag states of
suspected vessels, e.g., [27]. However, they represent the best
available publicly recorded synthesis of suspected IUU activities in
the CCAMLR area. All vessels included in the description of
trends for catch location, flag states, and officer and crew
nationality, have either been sanctioned or identified as suspected
IUU vessels in official documents from CCAMLR, international
(ITLOS, International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas) or
national court proceedings, or in public documents from
governments. Records from NGO reports or newspaper articles
referring to sightings of vessels without such official records are not
included. Information on suspected IUU ports are, however,
drawing on additional sources (Table S2) and include vessels that
have not been officially alleged to be engaged in IUU activities.
The recorded landings of toothfish are from vessels not licensed to
fish by CCAMLR and/or landing toothfish without proper catch
documentation [19]. Only details on locations and amounts are
included from the reports of suspected IUU landings and any
information on vessel name, flag state and crew has been omitted.
Governance capacity
The capacity of CCAMLR to effectively address IUU fishing
between 1995–2009 is investigated using two different proxies: a)
the proportion of all records with vessels flagged to CCAMLR
contracting parties (CP); and b) changes in governance indexes
[45] of flag states of identified vessels. Here, we use regular year for
observations of IUU activities and corresponding governance
proxies. The proportion of recorded IUU activities by vessels
flagged to CCAMLR Contracting Party (CP) states were divided
by the total number of recorded activities for CPs and NCPs to
investigate to what extent IUU activities was associated with
CCAMLR. We assumed that non-compliance of vessels flagged to
CCAMLR CPs would be easier to address than vessels flagged to
NCPs. We also assigned two corresponding governance indexes
for each IUU activity in any given year. One index used the
methodology of Agnew [8] and pooled the governance indexes for
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and
Control of Corruption. We also used an additional index for
Violence/Stability of flag states. In the absence of an index for a
particular year, we used a mean value of adjacent years, or the
closest value for records prior to, or after existing indices. We
averaged all obtained governance indexes each year, which was
correspondingly weighted to the number of observations in the
analysis.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Sources for information on suspected offshore IUU
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